Introduction
A ddressing the issue of Stalinist communist cultures in East Asia, this chapter discusses how claims of ideological vanguardism shaped foreign policies of the ruling parties in the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) between the late 1960s and the mid1970s, as well as the role of the emerging Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) that came into power in 1975. The three one-party states formed between the 1940s and mid-1950s were ruled by autocratic leadership of either a collective or an individual type. Society at large existed only in social organizations created and controlled by a monopolistic party steeped in the ideological tradition of Marxism-Leninism and the practical experience of Soviet Stalinist rule. The public sphere was exclusively reserved for acclamations of loyalty to views and actions of political leaders. Except for the temporary all-out factional fi ghting during the early stage of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, individual and collective dissent was either suppressed or strictly limited to internal discourse within party structures.
The culture of those three socialist states was shaped to a high degree by the respective ideologies of their leaders. In the case of North Korea and China, imperative worldviews were handed down and derived from the absolute and unfettered power of one individual's concepts, perceptions, or musings. North Vietnam as a state in almost permanent war mode was only slightly different in the absence of a constant, single, most powerful leader.
Kampuchea later followed the North Korean/Chinese pattern of absolute rule but replaced public personality cults with a highly secretive mode of authoritarian hierarchy. All four communist parties shared strong ideological beliefs and embraced notions of being the Marxist vanguard from nationalistic viewpoints. Yet at the same time they considered their respective concepts, to various degrees, as superior and suited to serve as international models. Thus they aspired for greater roles both in the East Asian region and on a global scale. Those ambitions and claims brought them necessarily into ideological competition and confl ict with each other and fueled several regional and international developments.
Most American-, European-, and Soviet-centered historiography, fails to emphasize the crucial role of Asian actors and their communist ideology in the course of international history during the 1960s and 1970s. Such is not least the result of limited or nonexistent access to Asian and Soviet sources for the period concerned. Hence sources from Europe and the United States can help to shed some light on perspectives and activities of North Vietnam, China, North Korea, Kampuchea, and the Soviet Union during those decades. For an unforeseeable time, they represent a valuable substitute. In particular, party, intelligence, and government records from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), extremely well-organized and closed until 1989 and still well-organized and open thereafter, 1 provide insights into the authentic thinking, perceptions, intentions, and actions of East Asian communist countries and the USSR at the time. In its attempt to be a model ally within the Warsaw Pact, the GDR was particularly close to the Soviet Union. It became thus also extremely well informed about Moscow's policies, especially through interactions with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) apparatus and the Soviet government.
Obviously, East German closeness to Soviet perspectives sometimes engendered a biased view. This is particularly true of some anti-Chinese outlooks and interpretations associated with the Soviet camp's "fi ght against Maoism." Overall a small country like the GDR elicited more sympathy and friendly contacts in East Asia than the "superpower" Soviet Union. The East German state considered German unifi cation on socialist terms a long shot and struggled to consolidate its position vis-à-vis West Germany. In contrast, North Vietnam, China, and North Korea viewed their own national unifi cation in rather imminent perspectives. Nonetheless they felt to varying degree a similar fate, or even a special bond, with the GDR as another nation divided by "imperialism." In any event, GDR historical sources require very careful reading, considerable experience, and circumspect analysis to separate substance from bias. Most East German documents report accurate facts and
